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COMMENTS
WILLS-REVOCATION BY AcT TO THE DOCUMENT-EFFECT ON

Comc1L-The term codicil generally refers to a supplement to a
will by which the testator alters or adds to his will. 1 It may be
nominated a codicil by the testator or held to be one by judicial
construction. If it is to be operative at all, a codicil must of course
be executed with all the formalities required by the statute of
wills. But, just as it is difficult to describe a codicil without reference to a primary testamentary document, so also is it difficult
to determine the status of an otherwise valid codicil when the
will it supplements has been revoked. When the will has been
revoked, either by an express act of the testator or by operation
of law,2 how should a court treat a codicil which itself has not
been mutilated with intent to revoke and not mentioned expressly by a subsequent revoking instrument?
It should be recognized at the outset that this question may
be raised in either of two settings. First, should such an instrument
be admitted to probate? Second, if admitted, what effect should
be given to it? It is with the first of these two possibilities that
this discussion is primarily concerned, for it is at the probate
stage that the determination as to revocation must be made, and
a probate court finding that the codicil has been revoked obviates
the necessity for any inquiry into the meaning of its language.

I. THE ENGLISH CASES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF WILLS
Prior to the enactment of the English Statute of Wills,3 a
presumption existed that the revocation of a will revoked its
codicils.4 This presumption was rebuttable, however, by showing
that the testator had a contrary intent.
The earliest case to consider the question was Barrow v. Barrow, 5 decided in 1756. Although the opinion states that by the
law of England the codicil was not revoked when the will was
destroyed, in order to sustain the admission of the codicil to pro1 JARMAN, 'WILLS 25 (8th ed. 1951).
2 As to what events will work a revocation
'WILLS § 85 (2d ed. 1953) •

by operation of law, see ATKINSON,

a 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26 § 20.
4 Tagart v. Hooper, 1 Curt. 289, 163 Eng. Rep. 98 (Prer. Ct. 1836) ; Coppin v.
Dillon, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 361, 162 Eng. Rep. 1478 (Prer. Ct. 1833) ; Medlycott v. Assheton,
2 Add. 229, 162 Eng. Rep. 278 (Prer. Ct. 1824) ; Barrow v. Barrow, 2 Lee 335, 161 Eng.
Rep. 360 (Prer. Ct. 1756).
5 2 Lee 335, 161 Eng. Rep. 360 (Prer. Ct. 1756).
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bate heavy reliance was placed on the testator's intent to die
testate and on statements made by him after the burning of the
will that he intended his wife to get the property as the codicil
indicated. In Medlycott v. Assheton,6 decided in 1824, the court
clearly states the principle that a codicil is prima fade dependent
on the will and that cancellation of the will is an implied revocation of the codicil. Here the requisite intent to rebut the presumption was held to be lacking when the court found the codicil, in
which a bequest was made to trustees named in the cancelled
will, to be intimately connected with the destroyed will. The fact
that the cancelled will was the only means of ascertaining the
legatees under the codicil was for this court determinative of
the testator's intent.7 The only other case to arise prior to the
Statute of Wills was that of Tagart v. Hooper. 8 Here the instrument by its terms was declared to be a codicil to the will and
to be taken as part thereof. The will itself was not found after
the testator's death and the presumption of its destruction by
him with intent to revoke was raised. By its terms the codicil
made a bequest to trustees9 to pay income to A for life, remainder
over to B. The court adopted the view that the codicil was intended by the testator to be an additional bequest, quite independent of anything he provided for in his will, and that since
the codicil was not contingent on the will for meaning in any
way the presumption of revocation of the codicil by revocation
of the will was overcome.
Thus, it appears that the common law courts were willing to
accept and make determinative any available direct evidence of
the testator's intent that the codicil should stand although the
will was revoked. Where direct expression of such intent was
lacking it could be implied if the codicil presented a clearly independent disposition.

II. THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF WILLS
With the enactment of the Statute of Wills10 in 1837 the question should have become one of statutory interpretation. The
6

2 Add. 229, 162 Eng. Rep. 278 (Prer. Ct. 1824) •

1 Coppin v. Dillon, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 361, 162 Eng. Rep. 1478

(Prer. Ct. 1833), in
which the codicil was denied probate, was decided on identical grounds.
8 1 Curt. 289, 163 Eng. Rep. 98 (Prer. Ct. 1836) •
9 The report of the case does not indicate whether the trustees were specifically
named in the codicil.
10 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26.
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statute, on its face, purports to declare that no will or codicil
can be revoked except by certain specified acts to "the same,"
or by a subsequent instrument. Although it would seem, therefore, that the principal inquiry for the courts should be whether
the statutory demands have been met, this was not the immediate
effect. Two cases, Goods of Halliwell11 and Clogstoun v. Walcott,12 decided by the same judge13 only a year apart, demonstrate
the confusion which existed. Goods of Halliwell (1846) presented
a codicil which made no bequests or appointments but related
solely to settlement of accounts between testator and his business
partner. The court still spoke in terms of a presumption that
the codicil will fall with the will. In this instance it was admitted
to probate when the court found that the codicil was made for a
special purpose, that it was totally independent of the general
disposition of property, and that therefore it did not appear that
testator could have meant to destroy the codicil with the will. 14
No mention was made in the opinion of the wills statute enacted nine years earlier. In Clogstoun v. Walcott (1847) the
testator, after destroying his will by burning it, expressed orally
his intention that two codicils which still existed should be effective. The court recognized that the wills statute must be
considered, and held that the presumption of revocation which
existed prior to the act no longer applied and that the codicils
should be admitted to probate unless the testator's intent to
revoke them is shown.15 However, the court went far to defeat
the operation of the statute by saying that the revocation of the
will is prima fade evidence of testator's intent to revoke the
codicil. Thus the burden is placed again on the party offering
the codicil. Here the codicils were admitted when the court
allowed oral testimony of testator's intent in order to rebut the
prima fade evidence of revocation.
In an apparent return to the pre-statute presumption, the
court in Grimwood v. Cozens16 declared that the revocation of
4 N.C. 400 (Prer. Ct. 1846).
5 N.C. 623 (Prer. Ct. 1847).
Sir H. Jenner Fust.
See Goods of Coulthard, 11 Jur. N.S. Pt. 1, 184 (P. Ct. 1865) which cites this
case, Tagart v. Hooper, 1 Curt. 289, 163 Eng. Rep. 98 (Prer. Ct. 1836) and Barrow v.
Barrow, 2 Lee 335, 161 Eng. Rep. 360 (Prer. Ct. 1756) as authority for summarily
admitting the codicil to probate; Goods of Clements, [1892] P. 254 admits a codicil to
probate, citing Goods of Coulthard, supra, as authority.
15 The opinion does not indicate any theory for this reversal.
16 2 Swab. &: T. 364, 5 Jur. N.S. Pt. 1, 497 (P. Ct. 1859).
11
12
13
14
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a will revoked its codicils unless the testator's contrary intent
was found. On the basis of written but non-testamentary documents, in which the testator declared his intent that the codicils
should fail, the court held that the codicils were revoked.
A new point of departure17 was developed in 1864 in Goods
of Ellice, 18 where the decision to admit the codicil to probate was
based on the substantially independent character of the instrument. Although it is possible to view this decision as indicating
merely another method of determining intent of the testator, the
court appears more concerned with the language of the instrument
itself and its ability to stand apart from the will and still make
some sense as a testamentary disposition. Although the result in
this case is the same as that which would have been reached on
the basis of the pre-statute Medlycott and Tagart cases, the difference in theory is significant. Here, the .independence of the
instrument becomes the ultimate fact while in the earlier two
cases it is but evidentiary, to be weighed along with other available
evidence tending to show the testator's intent. Thus, under the
theory of the Medlycott and Tagart cases, an instrument, independent on its face, would be denied probate if other evidence
established the testator's intent that it should fall. Such a result
is not possible under the theory of Goods of Ellice.
From the discussion of the four immediately preceding cases
it is clear that regardless of which presumption the courts purported to follow with regard to revocation of the codicil, the
primary inquiry was into the testator's intent rather than compliance with the wills statute. By following this course the courts
arguably have failed to appreciate the significance of the legislative act. It is fundamental to the statute that, regardless of testator's intent, an instrument not properly executed could not make
a testamentary disposition of property. Similarly, regardless of
testator's intent, a will or codicil should be valid and subsisting
unless mutilated with intent to revoke. 19 The case of express revocation presents the problem in a different setting. In such a
situation, intent may be a decisive factor. If a testator in a subsequent properly-executed instrument says merely, "I revoke my
will," it may be proper to inquire if he meant will in its technical
17 Some similar language is to be found in earlier cases but this is the first to give
it primary emphasis.
18 33 L.J.P.M. &: A. 27, 12 Weekly L. R. 353 (P. Ct. 1864).
19 ATKINSON, op. dt. supra note 2, § 84.
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sense or "will" as his total testamentary scheme. With such facts,
there would be a valid revocatory instrument; the only inquiry
is what is revoked.· Intent either to execute or revoke, as the
case may be, becomes significant only if the required technical
steps have been taken. Although it is apparent that in some
cases the testator's subjective intent may be thwarted because
of failure to comply with the statutory requirements, it is generally conceded that the underlying policy of the wills statutes, to
prevent frauds, and the basic means chosen by the legislature to
achieve this end, requirement of certain objective acts, should
be preserved.20
The first case to give any serious consideration to the implication of the Statute of Wills21 was Black v. ]obling,22 decided in
1869, thirty-two years after the statute was adopted. Here a testator executed a will and two codicils. The will and first codicil
could not be found after testator's death, giving rise to the presumption of their destruction animus revocandi. Lord Penzance,
for the court, after reviewing some of the prior decisions, gave
consideration to the requirements of the wills act regarding revocation23 and determined that since the codicil had not been revoked
in any mode indicated by the statute the codicil should be admitted. The following year, in a somewhat more emphatic restatement of his opinion in Black v. Jobling,24 Lord Penzance in Goods
of Savage 25 declared that the words of the statute were imperative
and that a court could not, in the face of the statutory language,
hold that a codicil had been revoked by the mere revocation of the
will.
Following the doctrine laid down in the two immediately preceding cases, the court in Goods of Turner,26 with Lord Penzance
again writing the opinion, went to the matter of construction and
held that difficulty in interpretation of language of the codicil be20 Ibid.
21 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26.
22 L. R. 1 P. &: D. 685 (1869).
23 "That no will or codicil or any

part thereof shall be revoked otherwise than • • •
by another will or codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required, or by some writing
declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a will
is hereinbefore required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same by the testator or by some person in his presence and by his direction, with
the intention of revoking the same."
24 L. R. 1 P. &: D. 685 (1869).
25 L. R. 2 P. &: D. 78 (1870).
26 L. R. 2 P. &: D. 403 (1872).
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cause of references to the will is not cause to prevent probate of
the codicil. Questions of construction were declared to be for
another court. It would appear, therefore, that the old theory
turning on the independence of the instrument had been rejected.
In Goods of Bleckley,21 the only case to arise in which the
codicil was not a separate physical instrument, the court held the
revocation of the will to be a revocation of the codicil. This case,
decided after Goods of Turner,28 arose when the testator after
executing a will added a properly-executed codicil at the foot
of the will and subsequently cut his signature from the will without mutilating the codicil in any way. Parol evidence was ad•
mitted to show the testator's intent to revoke the codicil. The
court held it to be a matter of testator's intent whether or not the
codicil was revoked, and on the evidence found that it was revoked.
This case, which appears to return to the earlier theory of testator's
intent, is superficially analogous to the situation presented when a
clause in a will has been crossed out and it must be determined if
a partial rather than complete revocation was intended. In such a
case it is clear that whether the crossing out revokes all or only a
part of the instrument depends on the intent of the testator. 29
Although this analogy perhaps renders Bleckley understandable,
the result remains unsatisfactory when it is remembered that the
codicil itself has in no way been burned, torn, or otherwise mutilated.
Any implication that Goods of Bleckley 30 would mark a return
to consideration of testator's intent as the determinative factor in
revocation of a codicil was set to rest three years later when the
same court in Gardiner v. Courthope,31 faced with another codicil,
followed the line of decisions upholding the integrity of the wills
statute. 82 Although discussion of intent is found in Gardiner, the
decision is squarely based on the fact that there had been no revocation in any mode set out in the statute. As to the intent element, the court said intent to revoke could not be found from the
fact that the will had been revoked, even if the codicil depended
8 P.D. 169 (1883).
L. R. 2 P. & D. 403 (1872).
See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 86.
so 8 P.D. 169 (1883).
Sl 12 P.D. 14 (1886).
S2 Goods of Turner, L.R. 2 P. & D. 403 (1872); Goods of Savage, L.R. 2 P. & D. 78
(1870); Black v. Jobling, L.R. l P. & D. 685 (1869).
21
28
20
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on the will for its meaning, and therefore there was no evidence of
testator's intent to revoke the codicil.
Thus, the English law evolved from a period when intent was
the first and only consideration given by the courts in determining
whether to probate a codicil to a revoked will to the present, relatively well-settled rule that revocation to be effective must meet the
objective standards of the wills statute.

III. THE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN LAW
Forty-nine states33 have a general provision specifying those
acts to the document which, when done with the proper intent,
will effectively revoke a testamentary instrument.34 But in only
eight states is there a statutory provision expressly dealing with
the effect to be given a codicil after the will has been revoked, and
in each instance the statute provides that the revocation of the
will revokes all codicils to that will.35 The wording of the statutes
in the remaining forty-one jurisdictions begins, generally, in one
of two ways: "No will or codicil or any part thereof ..." 36 or "No
will .... " 37 Following this language is a description of the physical
acts or kinds of instruments that are necessary to effect a revocation. The English Statute of Wills, in effect since 1837, was the
model for several of the American statutes,38 and its provisions are
Tennessee is the only state in which there is no such provision.
See Rees, American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 871-81 (1960).
35 CAL. PROB. CODE § 79; FLA. STAT. § 731.16 (1959) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-318
(1947); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-134 (1947); N. D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-15 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 113 (1951) ; S. D. CoDE § 56.0230 (1939); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 74-1-30
(1953) • The same provision is found in GUAM PROB. CODE § 79 (1953) •
36 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-162 (1958) ; KY. REV. STAT. § 394.080 (1960); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-5-10 (1956); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64-59 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4045 (1955).
37 ALA. CODE tit. 61 § 26 (1960); ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 59-3-6 (1949) ; ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-126 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-406 (Supp. 1959); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 152-5-4 (1953) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 109 (1953) ; D. C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-103 (1951); GA. CoDE § 113-404 (1959); HAWAII REv. LAws § 322-8 (1955); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 197 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-506 (1953) ; IOWA CODE § 633.10
(1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-611 (1949) ; LA. C1v. ConE ANN. art. 1691 (West
1952) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 169, § 3 (1954) ; Mn. ANN. CoDE art. 93, § 351 (1957) ;
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 8 (1955) ; MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 702.9 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.19 (1947) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 658 (1956) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.400 (1956) ; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-209 (1956) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120 (1959) ; N. H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 551:13 (1955); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-3 (1953); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8 (1953);
N. Y. DECED. EsT. LAw § 34; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.1 (Supp. 1959); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.33 (Page 1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 114.110 (1957); s. C. CODE § 19·221
(1952); TEX. PROB. CODE § 63 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 11 (1958); WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.12.040 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 238.14 (1957) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-51 (1957).
38 See statutes cited note 36 supra.
33
34
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fairly typical. It provides: "That no will or codicil, or any part
thereof, shall be revoked otherwise than . . . by the burning, tearing or otherwise destroying the same...." 39 The language of this
section purports to provide the exclusive means by which a will
or codicil may be revoked. Aside from revocation by another testamentary instrument, an act must be done to the will or codicil in
order to work a revocation. The words "the same" used in the
statute clearly relate back to "will or codicil." Thus it seems inconceivable that a jurisdiction in which such a statute is in force
could arrive at any conclusion other than that a codicil to be revoked must itself be mutilated in some manner. 40 Only by reading
"will or codicil" to mean "will and codicil41 or codicil," is it
possible to construe the wills statute not to apply to the case where
a testator with a valid will and codicil desired to revoke the will
without affecting the codicil. The statute, so interpreted, would
merely provide the testator with explicit directions for revoking
both his will and codicil, or merely his codicil. Such an answer,
which is not suggested in the opinions, does not seem satisfactory.
The statute declares those acts which will be sufficient to revoke
a codicil and no distinction is made between revocation of a codicil
to a valid will and revocation of a codicil after the will itself has
been revoked. 42 Any attempt to make this distinction would be
judicial legislation.
The revocation clause of the Pennsylvania statute43 presents the
problem in a somewhat different light. It reads: "No will or
codicil in writing, or any part thereof, can be revoked or altered
otherwise than: . . . (3) Act to the document. By being burnt,
torn, canceled, obliterated or destroyed.... "
The section is, on its face, open to a plausible construction by
which revocation of a will could operate as a revocation of its
codicils. This statute also appears to be imperative and exclusive,
but by speaking in terms of an "act to the document" leaves open
the possibility that "document" could be construed to mean the
89 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26. Omitted from this quotation are provisions regarding
revocation by subsequent instrument and revocation by operation of law.
4u The only rational explanation for the result reached in the English cases decided
immediately after the wills statute was adopted would appear to be that the courts did
not consider that the situation under discussion was one to which the statute applied.
41 Thus interpreted "will and codicil" would have the meaning of "will" in its
non-technical sense of a complete testamentary scheme.
42 See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 86.
43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 180.5 (1950).
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will and its codicils as a single testamentary instrument. Thus the
destruction of the will would be a destruction of "the document"
within the meaning of the statute and the codicil would be inadmissible. This rationale has not been expressed by any court
faced with the codicil to a destroyed will, and the basic theory that
a will and codicil constitute but a single document is of questionable validity. Admittedly, a will and its codicils are taken to be
part of one and the same instrument for purposes of construction
and testamentary disposition; 44 but this is not so for purposes of
execution45 or probate.46 These results follow from the realization
that the testator, at the time of execution of the codicil, must
comply with the formal requirements of the wills statute and also
have the requisite testamentary intent. Formal compliance with
the statute in executing the will by a testator who had the proper
intent will not save a codicil in which either element is missing.
Further, it is generally agreed that the revocation of the codicil
will not work a revocation of the will even if the testator so intended. 47 This is a clear case of the courts adhering strictly to the
language of the wills statutes. An act done to one instrument, the
codicil, is not sufficient to revoke another, the will. The same
principle would seem applicable in the reverse situation where it
is the will that is revoked by an act to that instrument.
Apparently only five American jurisdictions,48 in a total of
only sixteen cases, have been faced with the question under consideration. From 1866-when the first of these cases40 was decided
-to the present, there has been an amazing consistency in the
decisions. Despite the statutory considerations outlined above, the
test laid down in all but one50 of the cases is that of the independence of the propounded codicil: if the codicil makes sense independently of the will its validity is not affected by the destruc44

§

Gelbke v. Gelbke, 88 Ala. 427, 6 So. 834 (1889); ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2,

86.

Malone v. Hobbs, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 366 (1842) •
In re Hunt's Estate, 122 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1953).
47 In re Hargroves' Will, 262 App. Div. 202, 28 N.Y.S.2d 571, 262 App. Div. 994,
30 N.Y.S. 2d 810, aff'd, 288 N.Y. 604, 42 N.E.2d 608 (1942); In re Miller's Will, 119 Misc.
4, 194 N.Y. Supp. 843 (1922) ; ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 86; Annot. 38 A.L.R.
244 (1925) • Contra, In re Brookman, 11 Misc. 675, 33 N.Y. Supp. 575 (1895) •
48 Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
49 Will of Pinckney, 1 Tuck. Sur. 436 (N.Y. 1866).
50 In re Brown's Will, 6 Misc. 2d 803, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Surr. Ct. 1957); cf.
Estate of Sapery, 28 N.J. 599, 147 A.2d 777 (1959).
45

46
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tion of the will. 51 It is not at all clear, however, what factors a
court will consider in making its determination as to dependency.
It appears that the less complicated the codicil, the more likely
it is to be found independent and hence admitted to probate even
though the will has been revoked. Thus, where the only effect of
the codicil was to designate a new executor,52 the will being republished in other respects, the codicil was held to be probative.
Taking the situation one step further, a codicil which not only
appointed an executor but also made a single bequest to a named
legatee was admitted. 53 Similarly, a bequest of money to a named
legatee, which was executed on a postal card in conformity with
the wills statute, was probated, although the will had been revoked. 54
Probate was also granted to an instrument, designated a codicil,
in which a devise of realty was made to a named devisee with directions that all estate, transfer, and inheritance taxes be paid from
the remaining estate. The will in this case could not be found
and the presumption of revocation was raised. 55 The reference to
payment of taxes from the "remaining estate" could have led the
court to the conclusion that the instrument was dependent and
therefore not entitled to probate. Seemingly such an interpretation was properly avoided since the testator would have an "estate"
from which to pay the taxes regardless of the existence of a valid
will. The codicil was therefore held not dependent upon the will
for meaning.
The most extreme case in which the codicil was probated was
one in which the codicil disposed of the testator's entire estate.56
The court held that although the will of the deceased could not be
found and was presumed to have been revoked, the codicil was
admissible and in effect was a revocation of the will. 57
Although the codicil is written on the same sheet of paper, it
Smith's Estate, 2 Pa. County Ct. 626 (1886) •
Estate of Sapery, 28 N.J. 599, 147 A.2d 777 (1959); In re Fould's Will, 21 Misc.
2d 402, 196 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Surr. Ct. 1960) ; In re Lundequist's Will, 183 Misc. 803, 52
N.Y.S.2d 234 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
53 Matter of Emmons, ll0 App. Div. 701, 96 N.Y. Supp. 506 (1906).
54 Matter of Steiner, 142 Misc. 710, 255 N.Y. Supp. 397 (1932).
55 O'Neill's Estate, 58 Pa. D. &: C. 351 (Orphans' Ct. 1946).
50 Smith's Estate, 2 Pa. County Ct. 626 (1886); cf. Newcomb v. Webster, ll3 N.Y.
191, 21 N.E. 77 (1889).
51 See I JARMAN, WILLS 25 (8th ed. 1951). This instrument was still a codicil since
it was intended to be an alteration of the prior testamentary document.
51
52
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is not necessarily revoked by a revocation of the will, if it can be
carried out apart from the provisions of the will. Such a situation
was presented in Youse v. Forman,5 8 where the court held the
codicil to be dependent and therefore revoked when it made reference to the testator's executor, a designation made in the revoked
will. 59 Where the paper on which the codicil was written was taped
to the foot of the will, the court held the codicil to have been
revoked when the signature on the will was cut out leaving a hole
in the page, although the codicil itself was not mutilated. 00 Surrogate Fowler's opinion in this case, In re Francis' Will, 61 makes it
clear, however, that even here revocation of the prior instrument
does not necessarily work revocation of the codicil if it is an independent instrument. The fact that the testator could have mutilated the codicil but did not do so indicated an intent to distinguish the codicil from the will. Despite this statement, the court
refused to grant probate to the codicil, which specifically named
a new executor and reappointed a legacy provided in the will.
The court decided that these provisions were not independent of
the will. 62
One New York case63 contains language which would seem to
indicate that a codicil could never be admitted to probate as a
self-sufficient testamentary instrument. 64 This position is reached
by adopting the theory that a codicil, by definition, is a dependent
addition to or qualification of a will, 65 and that when an instrument is published as a codicil the testator declares his intention
that it be merely incident to the will. At another point in the
opinion, however, the court indicates that an instrument which
can sensibly be executed apart from any others is actually a "will,"
and that despite its label as a codicil it can be given effect. This
·case, decided in the same year as In re Francis' Will, 66 was discussed
by Surrogate Fowler, who rejected the "definitional" approach
58 68 Ky. (5 Bush.) 337 (1869).
59 The court seemed to take the position that, had the codicil been independent,
then additional evidence of the testator's intent not to revoke it would have been
necessary to cany the proponent's burden of proof.
<lO In re Francis' Will, 73 Misc. 148, 132 N.Y. Supp. 695 (1911).
61 Ibid.
62 Cf. In re Ayres' Will, 43 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio App. 1940) .
63 In re Nokes' Estate, 71 Misc. 382, 130 N.Y. Supp. 187 (1911).
64 Similar language may be found in Will of Pinckney, I Tuck. Sur. 436 (N.Y. 1866).
65 Cf. In re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wash. 2d 833, 176 P .2d 281 (1947).
66 73 Misc. 148, 132 N.Y. Supp. 695 (Sun. Ct. 1911).
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suggested. 67 It does not seem, however, that it would make any
substantive difference which approach was adopted. On the one
hand, the court labels all independent testamentary instruments
"wills," and admits all "wills" to probate, while on the other, the
traditional definition of "codicil" is accepted but only independent
codicils are admitted.
It seems clear that a codicil which attempted to dispose of the
residue of an estate, after specific bequests contained in a will were
satisfied, would not be probative under American rules if the will
itself was not found after the testator's death and was presumed to
have been revoked. 68 In such a case the interdependence of will
and codicil is evident since the determination of the content of
the residue is dependent on the will. Accordingly, a codicil which
provided for an annuity from the income of a trust established by
the will was not probated after the will was revoked. 69 The only
donative provision of this codicil was totally dependent upon the
effectiveness of the will, for without the will there could be no
trust income with which to pay the annuity.
In re Brown's Will 10 is the only American case giving any indication of an awareness that the wills statutes might be determinative of the question. Here a codicil was admitted to probate although its only function was to revoke one provision of a prior
"will" which had not been executed in conformity with the wills
statute and was, therefore, not probative. Surrogate Bennett, recognizing that the codicil was ineffective to dispose of any part of
the testator's property, nevertheless admitted it because it was
executed by a competent testator in accordance with the requirements of the statute and had not been marked or mutilated in any
manner or revoked by a subsequent instrument. 71

IV. CONCLUSION
If the proposition is accepted that, at least for execution and
probate, a will and its codicils are separate instruments, and if the
wills statutes set out the exclusive means by which testamentary
instruments may be revoked, then clearly the courts should not
67 See Proctor v. Clarke, 3 Redf. Sur. 445 (N.Y. 1878) where the codicil was denied
probate on the ground that it had been declared to be a codicil and not a will.
68 See In re Pardy's Estate, 161 Misc. 77, 291 N.Y. Supp. 969 (1936) (dictum).
oo In re Bowles' Estate, 96 Ohio App. 265, 114 N.E.2d 229 (1953).
10 6 Misc. 2d 803, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1957).
11 Contra, In re Pepper's Estate, 148 Pa. 5, 23 Atl. 1039 (1892) •
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ignore the statutes when considering whether the revocation of a
will revokes its codicils. The mere fact that the provision of the
wills act regarding revocation speaks in terms of how "wills" 72
should be revoked cannot be offered as a valid theory, as the term
"will" in the statutes is declared to include codicil.73 Where the
statute speaks in terms of how "wills or codicils" 74 are to be revoked, the command would seem to be patent.
The nature and purpose of probate proceedings should also be
kept in mind when evaluating the position of the American courts
on the effect of the revocation of a will on its codicils. First, probate precedes construction.75 The traditional role of the probate
court is to determine if the instrument before it was properly
executed or if it has been revoked with the requisite formalities.
Any interpretative matters are for a later hearing before a court of
equity. It is not the role of the probate court to construe the
offered instrument for the purpose of defeating probate. Construction incident to proof of facts which must be established before the instruments are admissible is permitted,76 but when deciding the question of admissibility the court has no authority to
inquire into the effectiveness of the instrument to dispose of property.77 So long as it has not been revoked, the instrument must be
admitted if executed in accordance with the wills statute by a
competent testator not under undue influence.78
Second, probate courts, in general, are not equipped for the
difficult and technical legal task of interpreting and construing
so complex a document as a will or codicil.79 This is a subject
which should properly be left to the highly trained trial or ap•
pellate court judge.80 What is needed at the probate stage is a
convenient rule to govern the probate judge's decision. The wills
statutes attempt to provide for this by prescribing those acts which
See statutes cited note 37 supra.
E.g., N. Y. DECED. Es-r. LAw § 2.
See statutes cited note 36 supra.
Matter of Davis, 105 App. Div. 221, 182 N.Y. 468 (1905) •
Syfer v. Dolby, 182 Md. 139, 32 A.2d 529 (1943) •
77 Matter of Davis, 105 App. Div. 221, 182 N.Y. 468 (1905).
78 In re Tankelowitz's Will, 162 Misc. 474, 294 N.Y. Supp. 754 (1937).
79 MODEL PROBATE CODE 467-71 (Simes 1946).
so Id. at 468. The Model Code points out, however, that since there is a growing
tendency to place the administrative and interpretative functions in the same court
which must probate the instrument, the ideal solution would be to raise the qualifications
of the probate judge. This does not mean that there is no longer a distinction between
the question of probate, and the question of construction.
72

73
74
75
76
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he must find before an instrument can be admitted or be held to
have been revoked.
If the probate court were to adopt the rule that a codicil to a
revoked will should be admitted to probate unless it had been
marked or mutilated or revoked by a subsequent properly-executed
written instrument, as provided in the statute, we would have the
needed convenient, operating rule, which though easily applied
would not by its application cause undue hardship. Adopting
this rule will leave the parties with the opportunity of litigating
interpretative questions before a better qualified equity court. If
that court found the instrument to be incapable of intelligent
construction the instrument would then be of no operative effect.
However, if the court could give substantive meaning to the
words of the instrument it would be effective.
By adopting a rule that the codicil can have no meaning apart
from the will and thereby automatically denying it probate, a court
would indeed be following a convenient operating rule, but its
effect would be unreasonably harsh. There would be no second
chance on the interpretative questions. By taking the middle
ground of allowing probate to "independent" instruments the probate court is taking upon itself a task which rightly belongs to the
better qualified higher court. What may seem clearly dependent
to a probate judge might seem quite independent and effective to
a judge trained in the law. 81
It would seem, therefore, that the more effective operation of
probate law would result from the establishment of the principle
that a codicil, properly executed, may be revoked only by a physical act to the codicil itself or by the execution of a subsequent
revocatory instrument.
Roger W. Kapp, S. Ed.
81 As a simple example, take the case of a codicil in which a bequest of a fixed sum
is made, in trust, to pay the income to A, remainder to B. The fact that the will in
which the trustees were named has been revoked could easily lead to a determination
of dependence by a probate judge whereas this bequest could be given effect by the
appointment of trustees by an equity court.

